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Embodiment in 18th Century
Depictions of Human-Machine
Co-Creativity
Anna Kantosalo1*, Michael Falk2* and Anna Jordanous3*
1Department of Computer Science, School of Science, Aalto University, Espoo, Finland, 2School of English, University of Kent,
Canterbury, United Kingdom, 3School of Computing, Cornwallis South, University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom
Artificial intelligence has a rich history in literature; fiction has shaped how we view artificial
agents and their capacities in the real world. This paper looks at embodied examples of
human-machine co-creation from the literature of the Long 18th Century (1,650–1,850),
examining how older depictions of creative machines could inform and inspire modern day
research. The works are analyzed from the perspective of design fiction with special focus
on the embodiment of the systems and the creativity exhibited by them. We find that the
chosen examples highlight the importance of recognizing the environment as a major
factor in human-machine co-creative processes and that some of the works seem to
precede current examples of artificial systems reaching into our everyday lives. The
examples present embodied interaction in a positive, creativity-oriented way, but also
highlight ethical risks of human-machine co-creativity. Modern day perceptions of artificial
systems and creativity can be limited to some extent by the technologies available; fictitious
examples from centuries past allow us to examine such limitations using a Design Fiction
approach. We conclude by deriving four guidelines for future research from our fictional
examples: 1) explore unlikely embodiments; 2) think of situations, not systems; 3) be aware
of the disjunction between action and appearance; and 4) consider the system as a
situated moral agent.
Keywords: human-machine co-creativity, embodiment, creativity, design fiction, literature, digital humanities,
computational creativity
1 INTRODUCTION
Tools for assisting creativity are becoming more commonplace. New systems utilizing artificial
intelligence (AI) methods to empower the tools themselves to be creative are stepping in different
fields, including robots for playing music (Hoffman and Weinberg, 2010; Weinberg et al., 2020) and
singing (Miranda, 2008), sketching (Lin et al., 2020) and even fostering creativity in children (Ali
et al., 2019). These co-creative robots represent technological progress in machine engineering,
artificial intelligence as well as human-machine interaction.
The idea of machines assisting creativity precedes the current practical advancements by
hundreds of years. Simple tools such as musical dice were invented in the 18th Century to
enable musically ignorant persons to take part in writing music and received huge popularity
in the contemporary intellectual climate fuelled by rationalism (Hedges, 1978). Provided with
a pre-composed set of musical fragments, typically musical phrases that fit certain melodic or
harmonic constraints, people could construct coherent musical compositions by using dice
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rolls to select fragments from the set. These musical dice
games have acted as inspirations for more modern AI based
approaches to interactively compose music with computers
(see e.g., Lin et al., 2015).
In this paper we explore examples of co-creative systems from
Eighteenth-Century literature in different areas of artistic
creativity. We have focused on robotic and other physical
systems to emphasize the embodied aspects of human-
machine interaction. Like the example of musical dice games
we expect these systems to fuel the imagination of modern-day
researchers. In the same way that present-day design fictions
combine science fiction and design research (Sterling, 2005;
Bleecker, 2009; Dunne and Raby, 2013; Blythe, 2014), these
older fictions depict potential solutions for solving complex
creativity related problems and offer us a new perspective for
questioning our design solutions and research approaches. Bruce
Sterling, inventor of the term “design fiction”, argues that design
fictions aim to “suspend disbelief about change” (quoted in
(Blythe, 2014, p. 3)). By taking old speculations about human-
machine co-creation seriously, we may discover that new kinds of
human-machine co-creation are possible.
2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
This work aims to develop our understanding of embodied
creativity, by increasing our knowledge of how human-
machine co-creativity has been understood in the past. We
analyze five examples, selected by our literary expert author as
representative of human-machine co-creativity in the Long 18th
Century (c. 1,650–1850): two Romantic poems about aeolian
harps (harps played by the wind): Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s “The
Eolian Harp” (1795, rev. version 1817, in Coleridge and Keach
(1997)) and Eduard Mörike’s “An eine Äolsharfe” (1837, in
Mörike (1838)); E. T. A. Hoffman’s “Automata” (1814), a tale
containing a multitude of automatic musical systems and a
humanoid question/answer machine; the creativity thinking
aids featured in Laurence Sterne’s novel Tristram Shandy
([1759–67] 2009); the self-conscious Hackney Coach from
Dorothy Kilner’s Adventures of a Hackney Coach (1781); and
the artificial man Homunculus in Goethe’s play Faust: Der
Tragödie Zweite Teil (1832). Like contemporary design
fictions, these literary design fictions take a variety of forms
(poetry, fiction, drama).
We have chosen to focus on the Long 18th Century (c.
1650s–1850s) because it marked a watershed in the history of
AI (Riskin, 2016). At the beginning of this period, René Descartes
set the question of AI on a new footing with his mind-body
dualism; by the end of this period, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein
(1818) had spawned a powerful myth that still dominates the way
AI is imagined today. In between Descartes and Shelley there was
a period of great imaginative freedom, when authors
experimented with many different kinds of fictional AIs.
Descartes had shattered the Thomistic consensus that mind
and matter were interfused, and that only God could create new
forms of life. He argued that the body was a mere machine, and
that functions of life such as ingestion and sense-perception could
be explained by the mechanical workings of matter; the soul was
utterly separate from the body, and was responsible for abstract
thought alone (Descartes, 1988, 64–65). Later in the period,
radical materialists such as Julian Offray de La Mettrie (1996)
would dispense with the soul, arguing that thought was also just a
function of the body’s machine. These arguments made it possible
to believe that scientists might create a living or intelligent
machine using the laws of physics alone, and fired the
imaginations of writers and inventors alike. In our chosen
examples, all sorts of objects are imagined as potentially
intelligent: from bowling-greens and Pentagraphs to harps and
hackney-coaches. These visions of AI can seem strange and
eccentric to the twenty-first-century reader. This is precisely
why they are worth considering.
By the end of the Long Eighteenth-Century, speculations
about AI had become commonplace, and the marvellous
automata that had dazzled the European public had begun to
lose their allure for an intellectual or scientific audience (Hankins
and Silverman, 1999, 213–216). With her blockbuster novel
Frankenstein, Mary Shelley simultaneously revived public
interest in AI and sent the discussion in a new direction. The
myth of the rebellious superintelligence was born. In the 19th
Century, novelists such as Samuel Butler (1872) and George Eliot
(1879) extended Shelley’s ideas about how AI might evolve
beyond its human creators. In our own time, AI theorists such
as Kurzweil (2006), Bostrom (2014), Tegmark (2018) and (Russell
et al., 2019) have attempted to bring the Frankenstein-myth into
the scientific mainstream (Falk, 2021). Meanwhile rebellious
super-intelligent AIs remain a staple of contemporary science
fiction. By looking back to the Long 18th Century, before the
Frankenstein-myth set in, we hope break open the scientific
imagination, and open up new ways of thinking about the
roles AI might play in human life.
In our search for new ways of thinking about the roles of AI,
we choose to focus on human-machine co-creativity. In this
paper human-machine co-creativity is considered as a
collaborative activity between a human and a machine driven
toward an artistic goal. In human–computer co-creativity, co-
creation is often understood as the creation of artifacts via the
interaction of different initiatives (Yannakakis et al., 2014),
sharing of creative responsibility (Kantosalo et al., 2014) or
blending the machine into the human creative process (Davis,
2013). The term encompasses various different ways of
organizing the co-creative process and the human and the
machine can play different kinds of roles (for example, see the
classifications of such roles by Kantosalo and Jordanous (2020);
Lubart (2005)) or contribute to the creative process in different
ways (Kantosalo and Takala, 2020). The style of
human–computer co-creative interfaces is often similar to
mixed-initiative interaction (Allen et al., 1999; Horvitz, 1999)
for this reason, human–computer co-creativity is sometimes
referred to as mixed-initiative co-creativity (Yannakakis et al.,
2014) and the related interfaces as mixed-initiative creative
interfaces (Deterding et al., 2017). In general
human–computer co-creative systems can express various
degrees of co-creative intent on a spectrum from full human
intent to full computational intent (Deterding et al., 2017).
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The selected fictitious examples are analyzed as design fictions
for variations in levels of embodiment and creativity.
Embodiment was selected as a perspective, since it builds a
bridge between contemporary artificial intelligence research
and eighteenth-century philosophy. Eighteenth-century
scientists such as Jacques de Vaucanson and Wolfgang von
Kempelen argued that the achievement of AI would require
simulation of bodily systems (Riskin, 2003; Riskin, 2016).
These arguments appeared to be justified at the time by
extraordinary advances in the design of mechanical
calculators, in the construction of “automata” (clockwork
robots that replicated bodily movements), and in fields such as
optics and acoustics. Meanwhile philosophers such as Étienne
Bonnot de Condillac (1984) argued that cognition of external
objects would be possible only for an embodied being with a sense
of touch. These eighteenth-century arguments foreshadow
debates in phenomenology, cognitive science and
neuromorphic computing today. It was a period of
considerable speculation about the possibility of artificial
intelligence, and the literature of the period may contain
useful lessons for scientists today.
2.1 Selected Works for Analysis
As shown in Table 1, the examples chosen for this work
represent a variety of co-creative systems ranging from the
very tool-like systems presented in Tristram Shandy (Sterne,
2009), through to more genuinely co-creative examples such as
the mechanical musicians in E. T. A. Hoffman’s “Automata”
(1814) or the almost autonomous Hackney Coach in (Kilner,
1781). The examples also represent different kinds of
embodiment, from the utterly non-human aeolian harps in
Coleridge and Mörike’s poems (Coleridge and Keach, 1997;
Mörike, 1838), to Hoffman’s humanoid Talking Turk
(Hoffman, 1957), and the essentially disembodied
Homunculus in Goethe’s Faust (Goethe, 1832).
The first two examples are the aeolian harp poems of Samuel
Taylor Coleridge and Eduard Mörike. Aeolian harps were
popular stringed instruments of the 18th and 19th centuries.
They could take various forms, but all aeolian harps were harps
designed to be played by the wind rather than human fingers.
They were of particular interest to early researchers in acoustics,
who were perplexed by the harps’ peculiar creative properties:
when a harp’s string is plucked by a human, it can only produce
one note, but when played by the wind, it can produce a great
variety of different notes (Hankins and Silverman, 1999, ch. 5).
Poets like Coleridge and Mörike were also interested in the harps’
creative properties, but interpreted the harp in a more mystical
way. Coleridge, for instance, seems to have believed that the harp,
the wind, and its human listener all participated in a shared
consciousness:
And what if all of animated nature
Be but organic Harps diversely fram’d,
That tremble into thought, as o’er them sweeps,
Plastic and vast, one intellectual Breeze,
At once the Soul of each, and God of all?
(Coleridge and Keach, 1997)
In Mörike’s poem, there is a similar ambiguity. As the poet
listens to the harp, it is hard to distinguish whether the emotions
of the music are the harp’s emotions, the poet’s emotions, or
emotions that are latent in the situation as a whole. We see these
as poetic examples of extended consciousness.
In Part Two of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Faust, we
encounter a more typical fictional AI: the creature Homunculus.
Homunculus is an artificial man created by Wagner, a scientist
and alchemist. What makes Homunculus unusual, especially
when compared to more famous fictional AIs such as
Frankenstein’s monster, is his embodiment. His human body
is minuscule, and contained within a fragile glass phial. He
doesn’t seem to make any use of his human body parts.
Instead of walking, he floats in mid-air. He also has the ability
to glow, read human thoughts, and later, absorb himself into
other beings. In some regards, Homunculus resembles a
disembodied software program more than an embodied
human, despite his human appearance, and looks forward to
TABLE 1 | Embodied interactions in each example text.
Work Artificial agent Agent’s embodiment Human’s embodiment
Coleridge’s “Eolian
Harp” (1795)




An aeolian harp String instrument played by the wind The human poet (Mörike) interacts using sense of hearing
Goethe’s Faust II (1832) Homunculus Tiny artificial human enclosed in a glass phial; glows and can
read minds




The Talking Turk Clockwork fortune-teller with power of speech andmysterious
inner mechanism
Human characters ask the Turk questions, hear its
answers and peer into its mechanism
Artificial
performers
When activated by a human, the performers create music Humans activate the artificial performers, play alongside
them, and listen as the audience
Kilner’s Hackney Coach
(1781)
A hackney coach Coach can see and hear its immediate surroundings, but does
not control its own movements
Humans drive or ride on the coach, unwittingly providing





Audio or optical devices that change the appearance of an
observed object
Human narrator imagines using different aides to gain
different insights into his human characters
The bowling green A bowling green of soft earth that is shaped into a scale model
of key battlefields in the nine years’ war
Human characters manually update the bowling green
model as news arrives from the front
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the disembodied AIs of cyberpunk classics such as Masamune
(2009); Gibson (2016).
The artificial agents in E.T.A. Hoffman’s story, “Automata”,
are more down-to-earth, because they are based on actual
automata that were built and exhibited in Eighteenth-Century
Europe. At the beginning of the story, the main characters
encounter the Talking Turk, a clockwork question-answering
system of stereotypically Turkish appearance. The Turk answers
users’ questions, and is cleverly designed to defy users’ attempts to
work out how it operates. The other automata in the story are a
group of clockwork musicians, based on some famous examples
by the French artificer Jacques de Vaucanson (Riskin, 2016, ch. 6).
The main characters meet the creator of these musicians. The
creator turns them on, and plays a piece with them on his piano.
One useful feature of this example is that the main characters
disagree about whether any of the automata are truly intelligent
or creative.
Dorothy Kilner’sAdventures of a Hackney Coach (1781) is an “it
novel” or “novel of circulation”. This was a popular genre of fiction
in the late 18th Century, in which an inanimate character such as a
coin, atom or statue would narrate their adventures in the world
(Bellamy, 2007). In Kilner’s novel, the narrator is a Hackney Coach,
who is driven around London and the surrounding area picking up
passengers from different social classes. The novel is told from the
Hackney Coach’s perspective, as it recounts the conversations of its
passengers and describes the different places and events it visits.
There are two key creative collaborations: the Coach collaborates
with its passengers, who unwittingly provide the material for the
story, and the Coach collaborates with the human reader, to whom
the narrative is addressed.
Sterne’s novel Tristram Shandy (Sterne 2009) is the fictional
autobiography of the main character, Tristram Shandy. It is a
famously experimental and unusual novel. Although it is
ostensibly the story of Tristram’s life, he gets so sidetracked
describing the lives of his father, Walter Shandy, and his
Uncle Toby, that never manages to narrate more than the first
few years of his own life. The book also contains many
digressions, where Tristram discusses the art of novel-writing
and other mostly irrelevant topics.
Tristram Shandy includes two interesting examples of co-
creative machines. In Volume 1, Chapter 23 the narrator
describes several imaginary writing aids that allow the writer to
develop character depictions. Momus’s glass is a device installed on
a character’s chest, which enables the writer to perceive the inner
workings of the character’s soul as if through a window. Other
writing aids include musical instruments that play the characters’
emotions, a Pentagraph, a mechanical device that exactly replicates
themovements of the humanwriter’s pen, and the “Hobby-Horse”,
which Tristram uses to reveal a character’s driving obsession. For
clarity, we have focused on Momus’ glass, the most extreme and
also best-described of Tristram’s imaginary co-creative machines.
The second main co-creative system is the bowling green used by
Uncle Toby, which Tristram describes in particular in Volume 2,
Chapter 1, and Volume 6, Chapters 21–23. The bowling green is a
massive model of the Nine Years’War, and, ironically enough, it is
Uncle Toby’s “HobbyHorse”, linking it to the first set of co-creative
machines. We look at this model as a physical co-creative
environment in which Uncle Toby acts and analyses various
events of the war.
2.2 Design Fiction
How can two hundred year old fictional texts inform scientific
research today? None of the examples we have chosen describe a
scientific process by which a creative artificial agent could be made.
Indeed, some of the examples are impossible. Dorothy Kilner’s
intelligent Hackney Coach, for example, is able to see and hear
events in its immediate surroundings even though it apparently
lacks any sensory organs, and its personality is notably human and
English despite the fact it is a coach. Rather than explaining how
this kind of intelligent agent exists, the novel takes the agent for
granted and explores its implications.
We therefore propose to interpret these texts as design fictions
(Sterling (2005); Bleecker (2009); Dunne and Raby (2013); Blythe
(2014)). The purpose of design fictions is not to show scientists
how to solve a problem, but rather to help scientists determine
what problem they should try to solve. Design fictions achieve this
purpose by simulating the experience of interacting with new
technologies. Instead of describing how a particular technology
functions, or describing the process of manufacture, design
fictions presuppose that such a technology exists, and portray
what interacting with it would be like. A design fiction is typically
in the form of a film, novel, poem, play or art installation. When
we read or view such a fiction, we imagine ourselves in a new
world, where a new technology exists, and can feel what it might
be like to live with such a device. We imagine the future ‘from the
inside’, and gain an intuitive, embodied, subjective understanding
of which technologies we might desire to have or wish to avoid
(Burdick, 2019). In this way, design fiction offers two key benefits
to scientists: goalposts and warning signs. Goalposts: by painting
a vivid picture of humanity’s possible futures with technology,
design fiction can fire scientists’ imaginations and widen the
search space. Warning signs: by allowing us to explore the
“implications” rather than simply the “applications” of new
technologies, design fiction can help scientists determine the
moral and ethical implications of their research (Dunne and
Raby, 2013, p. 49).
These historical texts were not necessarily intended as “design
fictions”, but by focusing on the interaction between the human
and non-human agents, we can read them as if they were. To read
these texts as design fictions, we focus specifically on embodied
interaction. How does the embodiment of the fictional artificial
agent affect its cognition of the world and its interaction with
human beings? And likewise, how does the embodiment of
human agents affect their interaction with the artificial agents?
In Mörike and Coleridge’s poems, for example, the artificial agent
is an aeolian harp. Such harps are large stringed instruments that
are played by the wind. Due to this embodiment, they must be
placed outside or in a window, where the wind blows, and they
produce output in the form of sound. The agent is therefore
stationary, under the wind’s influence, and surrounded by
outdoor scenes. To interact with the harp, the human agent
must go outside, wait for the wind, and listen with their ears. Thus
the embodiment of the harp and the human intersect to produce a
particular kind of interaction. The poems describe this interaction
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in vivid language, recreating the experience of listening to the
aeolian harp and offering the reader an intuitive understanding of
what value such an interaction could have.
2.3 Embodiment and Creativity
Viewpoints on embodied creativity and collaboration, and on
embodied artificial intelligence more generally, range across a
number of notions (Chrisley, 2003; Ziemke, 2015). Competing
theories about the role of embodiment in cognition range from
theories of minimal embodiment, which look at the
embodiment of humans through a reduced body without a
brain, to views of embodiment that connect the body with the
environment, or allow it to absorb tools to extend its
embodiment, and all the way to radical views of
embodiment viewing perception as an action oriented
concept shaping most cognitive processes (Gallagher, 2011),
or behavior-based robotics (Brooks, 1991). Dreyfus (1979)
argued that some form of embodiment was necessary for
intelligence, echoing the arguments of eighteenth-century
materialists such as Condillac and La Mettrie.
Very few works of human–computer co-creativity address
aspects of embodiment specifically or take a stance on
different theories of embodiment. Embodiment is briefly
discussed in some works featuring robotic collaborators, such
as an investigation of task-transfer (Fitzgerald et al., 2017), and
the works of Saunders, Gemainboeck and their colleagues (e.g.,
Saunders et al., 2010, 2013; Gemeinboeck and Saunders, 2013),
which feature embodied robots that allow for shifting the balance
of co-creative initiative toward machine initiative. A few
theoretical works, discuss the extended mind theory (Bown,
2015), an enactivist theory for co-creation (Davis et al., 2015)
and the wide acceptance of creativity as a situated activity within
the field of computational creativity (Guckelsberger et al., 2017),
but there appears to be no unified view of how to look at
embodiment from the perspective of human–computer co-
creativity. Therefore for this paper we wanted to find a
disambiguation of embodiment that would more directly
address creativity and collaboration with machines.
Dag Svanæs (2013) created a bridge between creativity and
embodiment in his work investigating the role of embodiment in
interactive technologies. Svanæs applies Merleau-Ponty’s ideas
about the lived body and embodied perception into analyzing
interaction with technology. As a result he created three concepts
“the feel dimension”, “interaction gestalts” and “kinaesthetic
thinking” which he used to discuss different kinds of digital
products and interfaces. From the last concept he developed the
idea of “kinaesthetic creativity”, which discusses how a designer,
embedded in a rich context through their lived body can use that
experience to create new solutions to problems perceived in that
moment.
This paper examines the effects the embodiment of the
example systems may have on their creativity. In his paper,
Svanæs (2013) shows how to use Merleau-Ponty’s ideas
selectively to perform formative analysis of interaction with a
few examples ranging from abstract creative art to e-readers.
Svanæs’ examples focus on software oriented artifacts with
tangible physical interfaces. To be able to compare fictitious
robotic examples in a summative, systematic manner, we took
the twelve key components Svanæs’ derives from Merleau-
Ponty’s (1962) to support his user interaction concepts and
turned them into comparison criteria. The twelve criteria are
active perception; perception shaped by the phenomenal field;
directed perception; mediating perception through artifacts;
whole body perception; the lived body; incorporating artifacts
into the body; body schema; bodily space; skills acquisition; the
dynamic nature of the body, tools and objects; and concrete and
abstract movement.
Following Svanæs’ (2013) descriptions, the first concept,
active perception, focuses on human perception as active uses
of senses instead of passive reception of stimuli. The second
concept, perception shaped by the phenomenal field, looks at
how the individual background, such as experiences and
training, affect human perception. The third concept,
directed perception, looks at the intentions of the individual
affecting what and how they perceive. The fourth concept,
mediating perception through artifacts, looks how the body can
adapt and extend its perceptional capacity through the use of
artifacts, such as by a visually impaired person navigating with
a stick. The fifth concept, whole body perception, looks at how
the whole body can be used automatically to extend
perceptional capacity, such as turning an object while
visually perceiving it to take in various angles. The sixth
concept, the lived body, considers the body as a general
medium of presence in the world. The seventh concept,
incorporating artifacts into the body, looks at assuming
artifacts as part of the lived body, such as a person using a
wheelchair. The eight concept, body schema, describes the
“nonconscious knowledge” an individual has of their lived
body and its potential actions in the world. The ninth concept,
bodily space, considers the degrees of freedom the lived body
has in the space. The 10th concept, skills acquisition, considers
how an individual is able to “internalize external devices
through learning”. The 11th concept, the dynamic nature of
the body, tools, and objects, looks at the changing contextual
meaning and purpose of the body, tools and objects. The 12th
concept, concrete and abstract movement, looks at movements
“made naturally as part of a situation” and movements made
for the purpose of movement.
We combine this analysis of embodiment with a separate
analysis of creativity. This allows us to explicitly consider
how embodiment and creativity interact in fictions of this
period. In modern creativity research, creativity is
characterized by many aspects (Jordanous and Keller, 2016),
which vary in importance across domains. Over the years some
authors such as Kantosalo and Takala (2020) have attempted
to establish frameworks for describing human–computer co-
creativity that take into account various theories of human
creativity, including for example Glăveanu (2013) and
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988) views of creativity as a
socio–cultural act and Glăveanu’s views of material
affordances of the creative environment. But to our
knowledge, there is no single definition for creativity that is
adopted over others in human–computer co-creativity
research. Therefore for our analysis we have attempted to
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find some more general definitions of creativity that would fit
the variety of the literary samples examined here.
Creativity research commonly adopts a minimal “bifold”
definition of creativity (Runco and Jaeger, 2012), but such a
minimal definition makes it difficult to classify the myriad forms
of creativity encountered in literary texts. Creativity is an example
of an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1955; Jordanous, 2012),
in that by its nature, creativity resists full, complete and fixed
definition (Corazza, 2016). The nature of creativity has been
much discussed from multiple perspectives and various
disciplines (Jordanous and Keller, 2016) (e.g., Guilford (1950);
Gero (1996); Gabora (2005); Hennessey and Amabile (2010);
Weisberg (2015), as a selection of a few different perspectives in a
vast and multi-disciplinary area of research).
It is widely acknowledged that practical concerns drive us to
adopt working definitions where necessary (Runco and Jaeger,
2012), definitions which others may see as partial or
incomplete for their purposes. This paper provides a good
example: we argue that the “standard definition” of creativity
proposed by Runco and Jaeger (2012) is insufficient for this
work, whereas many creativity scholars would find this
definition adequate for their purposes. Instead we include in
our considerations 14 components of creativity, which were
derived by Jordanous and Keller (2016) from computational
analysis of a corpus of seminal articles spanning a period of
60 years of research on creativity, from multiple disciplinary
perspectives. We do not claim that these components form a
conclusive and complete definition of creativity; however for
practical purposes these components enable a more divergent,
detailed and multi-faceted analysis of the literary and
embodied context of this work, considering aspects such as
generative ability and originality, as well as social interaction
and communication. The components are listed and briefly
defined in Table 2.
3 RESULTS
We conducted our analysis of the works such that relevant
passages of the works would be read by two researchers
separately after which the researchers discussed the different
elements of embodiment and the different aspects of creativity
in the examples.1 Based on these discussions we compiled two
tables which allowed for comparing and contrasting the different
examples through these elements and also to examine whether
the embodiment of the systems had any interesting connections
to the creative capacities exhibited by the examples (Tables 3, 4).
In each case, the question was whether the relevant fictional agent
was capable of the given component of embodiment, or the given
component of creativity. For example, in none of the fictional
examples did the artificial agent acquire a new skill, so all received
a null score for “skills acquisition” (Table 3). In some cases, the
situation was ambiguous. In Hoffmann’s “Automata”, for
example, the Talking Turk seems to display “general intellect”
TABLE 2 | Components of Creativity, with definitions adapted from Jordanous and Keller (2016).
Component Definition (adapted from Jordanous and Keller (2016))
Active involvement and persistence Being actively involved; reacting to, deliberate
Tenacity to persist, even at problematic points
Generation of results Working toward some end target, or goal, or result
Producing something that previously did not exist
Dealing with uncertainty Coping with incomplete, missing or ambiguous information
Element of risk/chance, lack of routine/pre-existing methods
Domain competence Domain-specific intelligence, knowledge, expertise
Recognizing problems and generating new ideas in that domain
General intellect General intelligence and intellectual ability
Flexible and adaptable mental capacity
Independence and freedom Working independently with autonomy over actions/decisions
Freedom to work, perhaps challenging cultural/domain norms
Intention and emotional involvement Personal and emotional investment, immersion
Intention/desire to perform a task, for fulfilment/enjoyment
Originality A new product, or doing something in a new way
Results that are unpredictable, unexpected, surprising
Progression and development Movement, advancement, evolution during a process
Some developmental progression in a domain/task
Social interaction and communication Communicating and promoting work to others
Mutual influence, feedback, collaboration
Spontaneity/Subconscious processing Thoughts may inform a process subconsciously
Reacting quickly and spontaneously when appropriate
Thinking and evaluation Consciously evaluating several options
Proactively selecting a decided choice from possible options
Value Making a useful contribution valued by others
End product is relevant and appropriate
Variety, divergence and experimentation Generating different ideas to compare and choose from
Multi-tasking during a process
1The exception was Faust, which was read by the literary expert alone, and then
discussed at length with the team.
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because it is able to listen to and answer any question posed by a
member of the public (Table 4). But the story is deliberately
ambiguous as to whether the android is actually intelligent or is
just a hoax: when the Turk talks and gestures, “die Rückwirkung
eines denkendenWesens unerläßlich schien” [the agency of some
intelligent being seemed essential] (Hoffmann, 1957, vol. 6, p. 82).
When we felt that an example was insuperably ambiguous in this
way, we have placed a “??” in the relevant cell of the table.
4 DISCUSSION
Advocates of speculative design argue that design fictions “can
play a significant role in broadening our conception of what is
possible” (Dunne and Raby, 2013, p.162). Our examples could
play this role, by helping scientists rethink core concepts of
computational creativity, including embodiment, agency and
creativity itself. These texts break down the usual template of
creative activity: the human being. They suggest that radically
non-human actants such as musical instruments, vehicles or even
the ground may exercise certain kinds of creative agency. If
scientists engage with these texts, they may rethink their
assumptions about the form a creative system might take,
invite new analysis of ethical and social implications, and open
new lines of inquiry.
4.1 Concrete and Abstract Body: Varying
Levels of Agency
Most of our examples describe creativity as an automatic or
mechanical process, which does not require intellect or self-
consciousness. In Table 3, for example, only a few of the






























Active perception x x x — — x x —
Perception shaped by the phenomenal field — — x — — x — —
Directed perception x x x — x x ?? —
Mediating perception through artifacts — — x — — — — —
Whole body perception x x — — — x — —
The lived body — — x — — x — —
Incorporating artifacts into the body x x ?? x x x — x
Body schema x x x — — — — —
Bodily space x x x x x — x x
Skills acquisition — — — — — — — —
The dynamic nature of the body, tools and
objects
— — — x x — — —
Concrete and abstract movement — — ?? — — ?? — —






























Active involvement and persistence x x x x — x x —
Dealing with uncertainty — — x — — — — —
Domain competence — x x — — — x —
General intellect — — x — — — ?? —
Generating results x x x x — x x —
Independence and freedom x x ?? — — x x —
Intention and emotional involvement x x x — — x x —
Originality — — x — x x x x
Progression and development — — — — — x — —
Social interaction and communication x x x x — x x —
Spontaneity and subconscious
processing
x x x — — x x —
Thinking and evaluation ?? ?? x — — x ?? —
Value x x x x x x x ??
Variety, divergence and
experimentation
x x ?? ?? x x x —
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examples display “skills acquisition”, a “dynamic relationship
between body, tools and objects”, or the distinction between
“concrete and abstract movement”. This last component is
particularly interesting in the cases of the Hackney Coach
and Homunculus. Both of these artificial agents have human-
level general intelligence, and are able to interact socially with
human beings. The Hackney Coach composes a novel
describing its life, while Homunculus converses with other
characters. But neither of them seem to distinguish between
unconscious “concrete” movement (e.g., the automatic
movement of the fingers while typing) and conscious,
intentional ‘abstract’ movement (e.g., carefully positioning
the fingers to pick up a sharp object). The Hackney Coach
moves passively, according to the pulling force of its horse and
the direction of its driver. It is therefore capable only of
“concrete”, unconscious movement, as its wheels turn to
accommodate the direction of the horse and driver.
Homunculus, by contrast, moves intentionally, but his form
of movement (levitation) requires no bodily action. In his case,
he is capable of purely “abstract”, intentional movement, but
not of “concrete”, unconscious movement. In this way, both
these agents break down the distinction between “conscious”
and “unconscious”, at least as far as bodily movement is
concerned.
This lack of bodily self-consciousness correlates with several
components of creativity. Few of the agents “deal with
uncertainty”, possess “domain competence”, have “general
intellect”, or “progress and develop” (Table 4). Their creativity
is generally spontaneous and adventitious, rather than self-
conscious and deliberate. In Coleridge and Mörike’s poems,
for instance, the aeolian harps create original music, decode
emotional information that is encoded on the wind, and
communicate it to human listeners who participate by
providing the missing ingredient of self-consciousness. Mörike,
for instance, describes how the wind:
. . . säuselt her in die Saiten,
Angezogen von wohllautender Wehmuth,
Wachsend im Zug meiner Sehnsucht,
Und hinsterbend wieder. (Mörike, 1838, p.52)
[. . . rustles hither in the strings,
Drawn by eloquent melancholy,
Growing in the pull of my desire,
And dying away again.]
The wind appears to feel some emotion, being itself “drawn” to
the poet’s melancholy. Meanwhile the poet responds emotionally
to the music of the wind in the strings of the harp. The harp
creates such music, and communicates such emotion, without
apparently having any kind of intellect or consciousness.
This example raises the difficult problem of agency: How can
we ascribe creative intentions or actions to the harp or the wind?
In his own aeolian harp poem, Coleridge speculates that there is
“one life, within us and abroad, — Which meets all motion and
becomes its soul” (Coleridge and Keach, 1997, p. 87). If there is
indeed such a global “soul”, “life” or consciousness that pervades
all things, then it would be perfectly possible for the wind to
intend or to act. But such a “world-soul” is scarcely consistent
with modern science. According to Riskin (2016, pp. 1–2), in
contemporary physics and chemistry it is considered
unacceptable to describe any physical system by ascribing
agency to its components. Probabilities and causes are
acceptable explanations, not decisions. This hesitancy over
agency is quite palpable in the field of computational
creativity. In a classic definition of the field, Wiggins (2006, p.
2) says that Computational Creativity is:
The study and support, through computational means
and methods, of behaviour exhibited by natural and
artificial systems, which would be deemed creative if
exhibited by humans.
This strange phrase, “would be deemed creative’, indicates an
insecurity at the heart of the field. If no agency can be ascribed to
“natural and artificial systems”, then how can a computer actually
be creative? At best it can merely simulate or model creative
activity.
This problem of agency, creativity and machinery is addressed
explicitly in Hoffmann’s “Automata”, when the characters debate
whether the mechanical musicians create genuine music. After
hearing the mechanical musicians, the characters Ludwig and
Ferdinand come to differing conclusions. Ludwig finds the
automatons’ music “zuwider” [repugnant], arguing that the
agency of a human musician is required to create true music
(Hoffmann, 1957, vol. 6, p. 105).2 Ferdinand finds the artificial
music beautiful, though agrees that it is inferior to human music.
Interestingly, although Ludwig loathes the machines’ music, he
nonetheless claims that music has an ultimately nonhuman
source:
“Kann denn”, ewiderte Ludwig, “die Musik, die in
unserm Innern wohnt, eine andere sein als die,
welche in der Natur wie ein tiefes, nur dem höhern
Sinn erforschliches Geheimniss verborgen, und die
durch das Organ der Instrumente nur wie im
Zwange eine mächtigen Zaubers, dessen wir Herr
worden, ertönt?” (Hoffmann, 1957, vol. 6, p. 107)
[“Can it be,” replied Ludwig, “that the music that lives
within us is different to that which lies as a deep mystery
in Nature, discoverable only by the highest sense, and
which is expressed by instruments only under the
compulsion of a mighty spell of which we are the
masters?”]
For this reason, although the automaton musicians are not to
his taste, Ludwig is more open to the music of Aeolian harps, and
claims that a “höhere musikalische Mechanik” [“higher
2This aligns with modern-day interpretations of what it means to be creative when
generating music (Jordanous and Keller, 2012): social communication and
interaction, domain competence and intention/emotional involvement were
found to be crucial factors, and Ludwig is questioning the ability of the
automatons to engage with their music intentionally and with emotion.
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mechanics of music”] is possible (Hoffmann, 1957, vol. 6, p. 105).
Thus even this more sceptical, scientific text leaves open the
possibility that nature itself may have creative properties that
could be harnessed by a mechanical system.
This issue of agency is particularly prominent in Tristram
Shandy, whose artificial agents lack not only self-consciousness,
but also “independence and freedom”, “intention and emotional
involvement” and also, in one case “originality” (Table 4). In
terms of embodiment, the agents also lack “active perception” and
the “shaping force of the phenomenal field” (Table 3). The
bowling green is entirely shaped by human hands, and has no
sense organs of any kind, while the writing aids, such as Momus’
glass, are essentially optic, acoustic or haptic instruments that
provide the writer with novel input about the character they are
trying to describe. Momus’ glass provides a vision of the
character’s heart, but there is no suggestion that the glass
actually sees the character’s heart itself.
Nonetheless, in the novel both the writing aids and the
bowling green frequently intervene in the plot and change the
course of events, displaying a form of material agency which does
not require any kind of awareness. In a mundane way, the
bowling green’s soil composition affects how well Uncle
Toby’s model operates:
Nature threw half a spade full of her kindliest compost
upon it, with just so much clay in it, as to retain the
forms of angles and indentings—and so little of it too, as
not to cling to the spade, and render works of so much
glory, nasty in foul weather (Sterne, 2009, p. 342,
p. 342).
This is the most obvious way the bowling green’s embodiment
affects its collaboration with humans, but throughout the novel, the
bowling green acts in other, more surprising ways. It is directly
implicated in Tristram’s accidental circumcision, for instance.
Having misplaced the chamber-pot, Tristram’s maid Susanna
instructs the young boy to “**** *** ** *** ******” (Sterne, 2009,
p. 301).3 Unfortunately, all the leaden counterweights in Tristram’s
house have been resumed by Uncle Toby’s trusty corporal Trim, to
be melted down and make cannons for their bowling-green model
of the Nine Years’War. The sash window falls, and the unfortunate
Tristram suffers a surprise operation. Admittedly, in this case, the
bowling green acts through human agents, whose search for raw
materials to upgrade the bowling green is the proximate cause of the
accident. But the novel is replete with jokes the blur the boundaries
between human bodies and physical objects in their environment.
Tristram’s mother relies on hearing the sound of Tristram’s father
winding the clock in order to experience sexual arousal (Sterne,
2009, p. 9). Near the end of the novel, when Uncle Toby is wooing
the widow Wadman, she is curious about the groin injury he
sustained at the siege of Namur. “You shall lay your finger upon the
place”, Uncle Toby tells her (Sterne, 2009, p. 514). She is at first
surprised by this intimate suggestion, but Uncle Toby then fetches a
map, and allows her to lay her finger on the geographical place
where he was wounded. The map and the man become thoroughly
confused. The confusion is even greater when we consider that
Uncle Toby’s bowling green is also the “Hobby Horse” that
Tristram uses as a writing aid to describe his Uncle’s character.
Tristram jokes that “a man’s HOBBY-HORSE is as tender a part as
he has about him” (Sterne, 2009, p. 91). Like a tender body part,
Uncle Toby’s bowling green can cause him pain, and Tristram can
use it as a creative collaborator to illuminate Toby’s personality.
It is in this broad context, in which human bodies and confused
with the material world around them, that the bowling green, and
Tristram’s imaginary writing-aids, seem to acquire agency, despite
lacking some of the usual embodied and creative components that
an agent would be expected to have. In its anarchic, comedic way,
Tristram Shandy foreshadows contemporary philosophers of
science, such as Jane Bennett, who argue that our conventional
understanding of agency is too narrow, and that mere matter may
have an “agentic power” that we overlookwhenwe define agency in
term of human intentionality and consciousness (Bennett, 2010, p.
69). Similar ideas about attributing creative agency to the materials
participating in a creative act are also expressed by some
computational creativity scholars, such as Bown (2015).
Tristram Shandy is not very explicit about where this “agentic
power” may come from. The bowling green shifts and morphs,
drawing Tristram and Uncle Toby’s bodies into itself; the writing
aids somehow create a connection between the writer’s pen and
the character’s personality. These processes are joked about rather
than explained. Similarly, in Adventures of a Hackney Coach, the
Hackney Coach simply is sentient, with no attempt to explain this
surprising fact. Aside from Coleridge, with his idea of the “one
life”, the only author in our sample who seriously attempts to put
forward a more general theory of creative agency is Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe. When Wagner creates Homunculus, he
argues that matter has an innate self-organizing tendency which
allows it to become creative:
Was man an der Natur Geheimnißvolles pries,
Das wagen wir verst ändig zu probiren,
Und was sie sonst organisiren lie ß,
Das lassen wir krystallisiren (Goethe, 1832, p. 105).
[What we thought before was Nature’s secret,
That is what we now dare to experiment with.
And what Nature once allowed to self-organize,
We now allow to crystallise.]
Homunculus is “crystallized” out of a material that already has a
natural tendency to organize itself. Even Wagner, the human
scientist who is an agent in the usual sense, “lässt” [“lets”] the
crystallization occur. As in the case of the Aoelian harps, where the
environment itself, the wind, plays a key role in the creative process,
in Faust, there seems to be no real difference between human agents
and inert matter—everything has some kind of “agentic” or
“organizing” power, and can collaborate in the creative process.
These texts present a challenging view of creative agency,
which could influence the way researchers design creative robotic
systems. First, if an object can be a creative agent while lacking
intelligence, intention and even perception, then this could
impact how we evaluate creative systems (Jordanous, 2017;3“Piss out of the window”
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Kantosalo, 2019). This problem of evaluation, as we have seen, is
explicitly raised in Hoffmann’s “Automata’, when Ferdinand and
Ludwig dispute the creativity and intelligence of the story’s
robotic systems, based on their differing attitudes about the
uniqueness of human agency. Secondly, by opening up the
field of how a creative agent might be embodied, these texts
could inspire new designs. A creative robot could emulate Uncle
Toby’s bowling green: its body could be a protean landscape, that
morphs in physical space to portray different information to the
user. A shape-shifting landscape-robot could be well-suited for
elementary education, could interact effectively with visually
impaired human users, or could provide adversarial training
for autonomous vehicles. The example of The Adventures of a
Hackney Coach has already been trialled by experimental writer
Ross Goodwin. His novel 1 the Road was written by a neural
network image-captioning system hooked up to a webcam that he
bolted to the top of a car (Goodwin, 2018). His neural network
did not meet the same embodiment and creativity criteria as
Kilner’s Hackney Coach (Tables 3, 4), but it did make use of a
vehicle’s embodiment as part of the creative system.
This view of creative agency has a third challenging implication.
By de-emphasizing the role of general intellect and other humanlike
forms of agency, these texts foreground the creative contribution of
the environment or situation. The Hackney Coach composes a
highly original novel by simply recording the chance encounters
thrown at it by the busy metropolis of London. Coleridge and
Mörike’s harps produce powerful music in collaboration with the
wind. The bowling green literally is the environment. With their
broad understanding of agency, authors such as Coleridge or Goethe
found it easy to explain how the environment itself could be creative.
An interesting challenge, ripe for further exploration in creative
robotics, is therefore to model how the physical environment has
input into the creative process, as reflected on by the “Press”
(environment) variable being one of the Four Ps of creativity
(Rhodes, 1961; Jordanous, 2016). Some useful steps forwards in
this area have already been taken, e.g. Saunders’ Curious Whispers
embodied interactive creative agents (Saunders, 2012), inspired by
Csikszentmihalyi’s systems approach to creativity (Csikszentmihalyi,
1988); and Jon McCormack’s Eden project (McCormack, 2001), an
artificial ecosystem where inhabitants have a creative interactive co-
evolutionary relationship with their environment. We do also
however acknowledge the alternative perspective of behaviour-
based robotics and related Artificial Life research, that advocates
a largely representation-free interaction with the external physical
environment (Brooks, 1991; Jordanous, 2020).
4.2 An Exploration of Ethics
So far we have considered these fictional examples as possible
designs which scientists could evaluate or emulate. But design
fictions can also serve another purpose: to help “us to explore
ethical and social issues within the context of everyday life” (Dunne
and Raby, 2013, p. 51). Our fictional examples reveal some of the
risks posed by creative AIs, and may help scientists anticipate
unintended consequences of their research. Kilner’s Hackney
Coach overhears the private conversations of its passengers
without their knowing. Goethe’s Homunculus is able to read
human thoughts. On a slightly different tack, Hoffmann’s
Talking Turk is built to conceal its operations, and to appeal to
racist stereotypes about Oriental mysticism; in these ways the
Turk’s creator uses it to prey upon paying customers, allowing
its creator to control and profit from the public (see Falk (2021)). In
each of these cases, the embodiment of the artificial agent affects
how humans interact with it, with potentially disastrous results.
Some of the examples are chillingly relevant today. Cars, phones
and home assistants all have the capacity to record their users, and
often do: What is to stop them spilling the beans, as the Hackney
Coach does, particularly as text generation improves? The Talking
Turk, meanwhile, offers a critical perspective on the design of
chatbots and other question-answering systems. How might
artificial voices or faces be designed, and how can consumers
and the public be protected from subconscious manipulation?
Homunculus presents a special case. His peculiar embodiment
gives him peculiar capabilities. Like the superintelligent AIs of
contemporary cyberpunk novels, he seems to inhabit a world of
pure information. Though he is able to hear and speak, he also
emits light that grants him direct access to other characters’
minds. Shortly after coming into existence, he levitates over the
sleeping character Faust, and observes his dreams:
Homunculus (erstaunt)
Bedeutend! –
(Die Phiole entschlüpft aus Wagners Händen, schwebt über
Faust und beleuchtet ihn.)
Schön umgeben!—Klar gewässer
Im dichten haine, Frau’n die sich entkleiden [. . .] (Goethe,
1832, p. 107, p. 107)
[Homunculus (astounded)
Remarkable! –
(The phial slips out of Wagner’s hands, floats over Faust and
illuminates him.)
Such beautiful scenery!—Clear water
In the shady grove, women undressing themselves [. . .]]
Through this direct mind-machine interface, Homunculus is able
to peer into Faust’s erotic dreams, which the sleeping professor would
surely have preferred to keep private. The character Mephistopheles
linksHomunculus’smind-reading capabilities to his embodiment: “So
klein du bist, so groß bist du Phantast” [So small you are, yet such a
great fantasist.] (Goethe, 1832, p. 108). The word “Phantast” is
crucially ambiguous, meaning something between “dreamer” and
“novelist”. There seems to be a relationship between Homunculus’s
tiny presence and fragility in the physical world, and his intimidating
presence and creativity in the psychic world. In the end, Homunculus
forsakes both his physical presence and self-identity altogether, when
he fuses with Proteus in a flash of light (Goethe, 1832, p. 178). His
choice of Proteus to fuse with is highly significant: Proteus is a
shapeshifting Greek deity of the sea, whose body never remains in
the same form for more than an instant. In some ways, Homunculus
seems to foreshadow cyberpunk fantasies about uploading the mind
into the cloud and living a virtual, disembodied life.
At first glance, Homunculus may seem barely credible as an AI
design, but in fact he exhibits crucial properties of actually existing
systems. Many contemporary AI systems exist primarily as
software, and lack embodiment in much the same way as
Homunculus. Likewise, Mephistopheles is quite right to suggest
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that Homunculus’s diminutive embodiment is linked to his mind-
reading abilities. Like Homunculus, devices such smartphones,
home assistants, cochlear implants or Elon Musk’s neuralink chip
all need to be small in order to penetrate human lives or human
brains. Siri and Alexa may actually reside in giant data centres, but
in users’ day-to-day lives they take the form of small, limbless,
glowing bodies, and persistently monitor users’ behaviour in order
to read (or rather, model) their minds. Both Homunculus and the
Hackney Coach take advantage of their embodiment to slip into
human lives. In bothAdventures of a Hackney Coach and Faust, the
results are creative and positive: the Coach produces a brilliant
satirical novel based on its secret observations, while Homunculus
develops a higher form of consciousness and merges with Proteus.
But the darker ethical implications are there to see, and may
provoke important discussions in laboratories and design studios.
4.3 The Method of Historical Design Fiction
We conclude this discussion by reflecting on the multi-pronged
approach to analysis adopted in this research. The Design Fictions
approach enabled us to treat historical fiction as sources of
inspiration for future creative robotics research. Our decision to
use componential characterisations of creativity and embodiment
has given us a multi-dimensional model by which to examine the
historical texts. By considering so many different aspects of
creativity and embodiment in a systematic manner, we could
highlight many new and useful details to bring forward from
the 18th Century to present-day attention, and we could consider
examples that may not have fulfilled the requirements of the more
rigid ‘bifold’ definition of creativity.
5 CONCLUSION
In our work we have examined several literary depictions from the
Long 18th Century (c. 1650–1850) describing different kinds of
embodied systems or autonomous entities capable of contributing to
human creativity. Initially, the idea of examining past fictitious
examples may seem curious; however the design fictions
approach reveals that these examples vividly capture some of the
ideals concerning creativity support and co-creativity during the
time. In particular, we see an emphasis on active involvement,
directed perception, experimentation and the ability to capitalize
on spontaneity, with embodiment and interaction crucial to
generating valuable results.
Based on our discussion of these examples, we offer four
guidelines to researchers in creative AI and robotics. These are
guidelines for discovery. They aim to widen the search space of
design and research possibilities, and give researchers a finer
sense of the contours of the search surface.What kinds of artificial
creative agents are possible? Which are preferable?
1. Explore unlikely embodiments: Eighteenth-century
examples invite us to widen the space of possible mechanistic
co-creative partners. In Tristram Shandy, one creative system has
a flat body of soft soil. In Coleridge and Mörike’s eolian harp
poems, the systems have resonant bodies of wood and gut. What
new kinds of creative action might be enabled by other strange
materials, body shapes and dimensions?
2. Think of situations, not systems:Our examples emphasize the
way that systems draw on the environment to create new situations.
The Hackney Coach creates a new series of connections between
people and places in London, because of its imperceptibility and
position in a network of human interactions. Inspired by such fictions,
researchers can look beyond individual systems, and consider what
new situations they would like to bring into being. What new
environments or connections, what new patterns of interaction or
behaviour might different embodiments bring about?
3. Be aware of the disjunction between action and
appearance: How an agent appears can often conceal what it
does. In Faust, Homunculous’s tiny, fragile body conceals vast
capacities—indeed, Mephistopheles suggests that his tininess
actually enables his vast capacities. Likewise the small physical
footprint of a modern agent like Alexa can conceal the large
distributed system it embodies, and enable that system to
penetrate people’s lives. Ethical designers should consider what
to conceal and what to reveal in their artificial agent’s embodiment.
4. Consider the system as a situated moral agent: We have
seen how in many of these fictions, apparently unconscious or
static agents act in self-consistent and unpredictable ways, much
like conscious human agents. Uncle Toby’s bowling-green brings
about Tristram’s circumcision. Hoffmann’s musical automata
challenge Ferdinand and Ludwig to reconsider who is the
composer of a novel tune. While it can be tempting to deny
agency to mechanistic creative systems, a mechanistic system’s
potential consequences come more sharply into view if we
consider the system itself as the one who acts.
Overall, like the example of the musical dice, the historical ideas
and inspirations we highlight above can capture the imagination of
modern roboticians and co-creativity scholars, and can inspire their
efforts, unhindered by any potential current technical blinders. Thus,
understanding how long-18th-century authors viewed mechanical/
robotic creativity offers a firm foundation for building models for
modern co-creative robotics. As famously observed by Sagan, “you
have to know the past to understand the present.”
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